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ABSTRACT 
There might be various aims for the vertical separation in railways such as the one instituted 
by the European Commission. One aim might be to improve efficiency, another one might be 
to introduce competition, as a mean, precisely to improve efficiency. Vertical separation 
creates, by itself, some disputes between the Infrastructure manager and the so called railways 
undertakings. So a dispute resolution system is necessary. First, this dispute resolution system 
is costly and thus might offset the efficiency benefits associated to the introduction of vertical 
separation. Second, this dispute resolution system can create a kind of collusive agreement 
where there is a quasi vertical re integration which does not favor competition. The paper is 
organized as follows : First the various kinds of disputes are analyzed. They are presented 
according to the following categories : - access to the track - slots allocation ; - timetable 
establishment ; - adjustments to the initial timetable ; - train circulation - delays - maintenance 
and renewal works - safety - estate - real estate sharing; - network minor changes - new lines 
Secondly, the methods by which those difficulties are dealt with are presented for two 
countries : UK and France. The British dispute resolution system relies heavily on co-
operation and contracts within the railway industry whereas the French system is more 
hierarchy oriented, thus generating less conflicts but which are, maybe, more difficult to 
solve. But we can wonder whether the present British system, together with the Network Rail 
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status doesn’t lead to a more integrated railway industry trough long term co-operation. 
Conversely, the difficulties that the French railway industry is presently experiencing might 
lead to define a dispute resolution system more able to favor some forms of competition.  
 
Keywords: railways, competition, vertical separation, dispute resolution 
INTRODUCTION 
Vertical separation (between infrastructure and operation) is in a sense an “artefact” in the 
railway industry where integration seems the most reasonable solution according to both an 
economic and technical point of view. Various reasons might have justified  the 
implementation of vertical separation in Sweden in 1988 (Nilsson, 2002), Britain in 1995 
(Nash, 1997) and finally in the European Union (the dates differs according to each country). 
But what we can take reasonably for granted is that vertical separation creates problems, even 
if it can improve the efficiency of the railways. One possibility to increase the efficiency of 
the railways is to introduce competitive pressure on historic monopolies whose best profit is a 
quiet life (according to Hicks, 1937). But the problems created by vertical separation can lead 
to various dispute resolution systems. And those dispute resolution systems can hinder true 
competition under the form of competitive tendering and under the form of open access as 
well. We will test this hypothesis with the example of  the British dispute resolution system. 
Conversely, the multiple occurrences of problems between infrastructure managers and 
railway operators can contribute to assert the property rights of the different companies 
involved.  The progressive building of a framework able to manage the conflicts between 
infrastructure manager and railway operators can be one of the prerequisite for the 
introduction of competition. The French situation will provide an example of this gradual 
approach to competition (see Henry and Quinet, 1999). 
 
Britain and France provide example of this interesting observation: where the introduction of 
competition was supposed to be radical, the dispute resolution system leads to attenuate the 
strength of the competition; conversely, where the introduction of competition is not 
welcome, the necessary dispute resolution system leads to pave the way for introduction of 
competition. This can be seen as an illustration of the tendency to converge for the European 
railways, after a first step of reform movement where the different countries were heading 
toward very different situations.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: 
First we will present the causes and the nature of the different conflicts which can occur 
between an infrastructure manager and a railway operator. Then in a second part we will 
examine how Britain and France manage those conflicts, which have different characteristics 
in each country. We will conclude by presenting some consequences of those analyses on the 
possibilities to increase the competitive pressure on the railway operators.  
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THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN INFRASTRUCURE MANAGERS 
AND RAILWAYS OPERATORS 
In this part, we have chosen to present the various conflicts, following the chronological 
process of train circulation. First, we discuss the conflicts that appear before train circulation 
(due to timetable establishment and programmed maintenance works). Then we present the 
conflicts that may arise during the train circulation (due to delays or operational disruptions). 
Last, we examine the case of future network changes. 
Before train circulation: access, and timetable establishment 
Access and pricing 
The monopoly of the infrastructure manager induces a strong market power. The IM could 
abuse that power by pricing too costly the use of the infrastructure, or by reducing the 
quantity, as well as the quality of the supply. So some conflicts between the infrastructure 
manager and the infrastructure users (the railway undertakings, hereafter RU) can arise from 
the pricing rules and levels, or from the service supplied.  
 
Concerning the increase of infrastructure fees, the position of the RU depends on the risk they 
bear. On the one hand, the increases of infrastructure fees are compensated to British TOCs 
and French regional services by public authorities, so RU are not directly affected by those 
increases. On the other hand, the repeated increases of French infrastructure fees for freight 
and high speed services lead to conflicts between the IM, RFF and the historic RU, SNCF. 
 
The access to the infrastructure has to be guaranteed to the RU, in terms of slot quantity and 
slot quality. Because the railway undertakings develop medium term business, they have to 
know the characteristics of the infrastructure services provided by the IM. The RU need to 
know the capacity of the infrastructure, as well as its overall characteristics: electrification, 
time interval between two trains, maximum length of the trains… Any reduction of those 
characteristics induce less charges for the IM, but is prejudicial for the RU. So it can lead to 
conflicts between them.  
However, it should be noted that an adequate pricing can prevent the IM from behaving so 
opportunely. For example, a pricing that would take into account the capacity and the 
authorized speed of the infrastructure gives the IM incentives to maintain the quality of the 
infrastructure. 
Slots allocation and timetable establishment 
Conflicts about slots allocation are frequent in vertically separated railways. This is due to the 
divergence of interest between the infrastructure manager and the railway undertakings. There 
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is no reason that the private interest of the infrastructure manager leads to a socially optimal 
slot allocation. Moreover, some requests of the various railway undertakings might be in 
conflict.  
There is a trade-off to implement, between the IM’s optimal allocation and the RU’s one. 
Both can be caricatured by the following figures: 
 
 
 
The infrastructure manager would like to maximise the infrastructure capacity, by grouping 
many express trains together, and many slow trains together. But this is not what the railways 
undertakings want. Each of them would like to mix express and slow trains, in order to 
homogenise the frequency of their services.  
The British Network Code itemises 13 decision criteria, when establishing a timetable: 
1. Maximising the social welfare; 
2. Enabling a RU to comply with any contract to which it is party; 
3. Maintaining and improving the levels of service reliability; 
4. Maintaining, renewing and carrying out other necessary work on the network; 
5. Maintaining and improving connections between railway passenger services; 
6. Avoiding material deterioration of the service patterns of operators of trains; 
7. Ensuring that the overall pattern of rail services is adequately spread in time; 
IM’s supposedly preferred slots allocation RU’s supposedly preferred slots allocation 
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8. Taking into account the need of flexibility of the freight undertakings; 
9. Enabling operators of trains to utilise their railway assets efficiently; 
10. Facilitating new commercial opportunities; 
11. Avoiding frequent timetable changes; 
12. Avoiding changes to provisional international paths; 
13. Taking into account the commercial interest of the IM and the RU. 
Programmed maintenance works 
Once again, there is no reason for the optimal track reservation for maintenance to be the 
same for the infrastructure manager and for the railway undertakings. The IM would like to 
minimize the cost of maintenance works, and so, to intervene on the track for a long time, but 
very few times. On the contrary, the RU would like not to interrupt their services, and so 
prefer many short interventions on the track. The conflict arise from the externalities borne by 
the RU, when the IM’s decision leads to trains suppression. 
Congestion 
Regarding congestion, the conflict is due to the lack of investment incentives of the 
infrastructure manager, when a part of the network is congested, that is, when the satisfaction 
of all the slot bids cannot be assured. In that case, railway undertakings complain that the 
infrastructure capacity is insufficient, and, sometimes, that the lack of flexibility of the 
timetable leads to many delays. But the market relation between IM and RU does not favour 
decongestion investments. This is due to the very poor (if any) rate of return of such 
investments. Moreover, when the pricing rule includes a congestion charge, a decongestion 
investment leads to reduce IM’s income, what decreases even more its investment incentives.  
During train circulation: delays, disruptions… 
Delays 
There are many conflicts related to delays in a separated railway system. Delays can be due to 
the infrastructure manager, when it is caused by a disruption of the infrastructure (switches, 
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signalling…). It can also be due to a railway undertaking, when the staff arrives late, or when 
the train has been kept too long in its depot. Concerning the effects, delays affect more RU 
(through a low quality of service), than the IM (maintenance is delayed by the last delayed 
train). So, externalities arise from carelessness of the parties ; those are borne by the RU, 
whose customers do not suffer repeated delays. So, each party of the railway system has to be 
encouraged, not to cause delays. 
Operational disruptions 
The principle of operational disruption conflicts is the same as the last one, but with more 
serious causes and effects. Operational disruptions are due to major events, such as accidents,  
blackout or serious damages. Accidents can be due to the infrastructure manager (neglected 
maintenance), as well as to a railway undertaking (rolling stock defect, human mistake). The 
costly externalities are borne by the RU (whose trains are suppressed or delayed), as well as 
the IM (whose asset is seriously damaged).  
Of course, these externalities are the first source of conflict between the parties. But the 
management of the disruption is also a source of conflict, given that the IM has to restore the 
operation of trains on the network. The IM has to give some trains priority over some others 
and, once again, its decisions might be in conflict with the RU’s interest. 
In the future: network changes 
Network changes are usually decided by the infrastructure manager, in order to improve some 
characteristics of the network (e.g. speed). But such improving changes can also reduce some 
other characteristics (e.g. operating expenses for some traffics). So, they usually generate two 
kinds of externalities:  
1. those due to the civil engineering works, during which trains circulation on the track is 
interrupted; 
2. those related to the network change itself. 
Minor changes 
Minor changes affect railway undertakings through several ways. For example, in France, a 
speed increase due to new switches has reduced the length of freight trains using the siding.  
Major changes 
Major changes, such as a new line, might oppose the infrastructure manager and the railway 
undertakings. For example, the SNCF wishes the high speed lines are regularly connected 
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with the classical network, so that the operation of trains is more easily restored after 
operational disruptions. On the contrary, RFF wishes to minimize the cost of the project, and 
so, not to repeat such connections. So, a rationale trade-off has to be found. 
 
This first part has shown that the disintegration of railways leads to many sources of conflict. 
Public authorities have to develop dispute resolution systems, so that those conflicts do not 
lead to less efficient railways than integrated ones. 
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS IN BRITAIN AND 
FRANCE 
The firms have to be regulated, so that those potential conflicts do not lead to effective 
disputes. Rules have to be set, in order to diminish the possibilities of opportunism for both 
parties, and to reach an optimal use of the rail network. In this part of the paper, we compare 
the two different ways chosen in Great-Britain and France. 
The British disputes prevention and resolution system: the Regulator, the Industry and 
the Contracts 
The industrial preventive rules 
The British disputes resolution system is decentralized to the railway industry. The 
relationships between the infrastructure manager (Network Rail) and the railway undertakings 
are defined in contracts and regulated by an independent regulator (Office of Rail Regulator).  
The Government intervenes to fix the total amount of infrastructure fees, which it subsidizes 
indirectly. 
This system is characterized by the prevention of the conflicts, through many rules decided 
inside the industry: 
1. The Network Code (ORR 2004) describes (in 237 pages) the track access conditions, 
such as the performance monitoring, the timetable change, the vehicle or network 
changes, the operational disruptions, or the access dispute resolution rules. This 
document is a compromise between the parties ; it can be modified after an industry-
wide agreement. 
2. The Rules of the plan describe the conditions of slots drawing, for each section of the 
network. It defines the time interval between two trains on the tracks, in the stations… 
3. The Rules of the route define the network maintenance strategy: when, where, how are 
the sections of the network maintained ? 
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The signature of a so called “track access agreement” between Network Rail and a railway 
undertaking completes these documents (which are then approved) by setting:  
1. The price, the quantity and the main characteristics (route time) of the slots, that 
Network Rail commits itself to propose to the RU. 
2. The so called “performance regime” (schedule 8), which defines the quality incentive 
scheme: number of minutes of delays allowed to each party, penalties, compensation 
for service disruption… 
The compensation principle 
The main principle of the British regulation consists in compensating each party for the 
externalities induced by another. The advantages of this principle are the followings: 
1. It is an incentive scheme: each party would optimize its decisions from a social point 
of view, rather than from an individual one. So, it leads to a reduction of the 
externalities described in the first part of the paper. 
2. It reduces the risk, borne by the parties: each of them has to be prepared to pay if it 
causes damages to another one, but it should not fear to support the whole effects of 
delays or operational disruptions, caused by someone else. This is an efficient way for 
attracting investors, and promoting competition. 
This principle plays in the regulation of the maintenance works, delays, operational disruption 
and network changes.  
Concerning the maintenance of the track, works that disrupt train services and penalize a RU 
are compensated by Network Rail. This compensation includes the whole loss of revenue. For 
example, in the case of the suppression of a Eurostar returning to London on Sunday, the 
compensation takes into account the loss of revenue for the singles on Friday and Saturday. 
So the penalty can be twice higher than the revenue of the suppressed train. These 
compensations are all the more expensive since the train suppression is anticipated. 
The compensation principle intervenes also concerning the works induced by network 
changes. But in that case, the increase of operational charges, induced to any party by the 
change, has to be compensated too.  
Last, this principle is applied to compensate the delays and operational disruptions caused by 
a party to some others. In the case of short delays, the penalties are defined by the 
corresponding loss of futures revenue for each party. This takes into account the number of 
passengers, their motives of travelling, the possibility of a round trip during the week end… If 
the delays are more important, the increase of operational charges is compensated too. In the 
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case of operational disruption, a railway undertaking whose rolling stock is out of order, pays 
for its assistance. 
 
The main disadvantage of this principle consists of the transactional costs, it induces. The 
mechanism is actually complex, especially when one has to decide who caused the delay or 
the damage. So, many people in the industry are paid to defend the interests of each party, 
while the fundamental causes of the events are not solved.  
In such cases where the rules cannot prevent the conflict, a dispute resolution system has been 
created. 
The dispute resolution system 
When preventive rules and co-operation do not lead to solve the conflict, the ORR proposes 
the parties to ask for mediation to the Railway Industry Mediation and Arbitration Service. If 
the parties prefer to take their dispute to court, the court of first instance is the Access Dispute 
Resolution Committee of the railway industry. The parties can appeal the first verdict to the 
ORR. 
The French disputes resolution system: the Government and the Law 
Due to very late introduction of competition, the French regulation has not been developed as 
the British regulation.  
A hierarchical system  
The French regulation is not decentralized, contrary to the British one ; it is mainly defined by 
the law, and by the Network Statement, written by the infrastructure manager, RFF. The law 
defines each year the network access and use pricing, decided by the Government. It defines 
the types of trains that have priority in slots allocation, in case of congestion, and it defines 
how RFF has to manage network changes. 
But although the French law has precisely transposed the European directives, it is necessarily 
insufficient to define efficiently the whole rail regulation. So the law refers for many points to 
the Network Statement of RFF (RFF 2004).  
This document is far more important in France than in Great Britain: it describes the track 
access conditions, the characteristics of the infrastructure, the slot allocation procedure… We 
know from the first part that the details of those points should not be neglected, given that 
they may lead to opportunism. This is one of the main failures of the French regulation: by 
leaving  the infrastructure manager a lot of room for defining such procedures, it might not 
lead to a socio-optimal slots allocation. Although that Network Statement has to be submitted 
to the railways undertaking and approved by the Department for Transport, RFF is free to turn 
it to its (relative) advantage.  
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A lack of incentives 
Another French regulation failure is the lack of incentives, not to induce externalities, such as 
delays. The French regulation does not propose the parties to be compensated for their loss of 
revenue, if they are penalized by another party. RFF and the Government prefer the parties to 
bear more risk, rather than setting a complex and costly performance regime, as the British 
one.  
On the one hand, a party that causes many delays on the network is not penalized and has no 
incentive to progress. On the other hand, RFF is free to disrupt train services if it wants to 
work on the track for maintenance; the RU have to support the corresponding risk. 
Concerning the network changes, RFF does not compensate the increase of operating costs (if 
any) to the RU.  
However, the so-called “contracts for use”, between RFF and the RU, define compensations 
in some cases of operational disruption: when RFF is responsible, the RU are reimbursed for 
the penalties they bear, due to train suppressions. When a railway undertaking causes such a 
damage, it has to compensate RFF for the loss of revenue due to suppressed or modified slots. 
This benevolent regulation does not necessarily lead to lack of maintenance, although this 
could become true, given that RFF has no incentive to maintain the network. This is due to 
the fact that the historic operator, SNCF, is also the delegate infrastructure manager of RFF. 
That is, the SNCF has to maintain the network on RFF’s behalf. Given that SNCF is the main 
operator of the network, it is its own interest to benefit of a maintained infrastructure. 
The dispute resolution system 
However, the introduction of private competitors may lead to conflicts that Government 
intervention alone cannot resolve. This is the very reason why a specific committee has been 
recently created, to help the minister to resolve conflicts due to timetable changes or access 
conditions. This committee is composed of three people, chosen by minister of transport. 
Each of them is issued from one important administrative bodies: the Council of State, the 
Audit Office and the General Council of  Bridges and Roads.  
CONCLUSION: WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
VARIOUS RESOLUTION SYSTEMS ? 
Any analysis of the railway reform process currently under way in Europe is difficult and 
must be considered as a tentative interpretation of an observation of evolutions limited in 
scope and clearly dependent on the time when the observations were made. Nevertheless it is 
useful to attempt to submit to examination some general analysis under the light of some new 
tendencies. The main hypothesis that we will submit to examination is the supposed 
convergence of the various railways competitive environments, through the analysis of the 
two cases studied in this paper : UK and France. This is particularly interesting because the 
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UK railways market structure was considered among the most competitive and the French 
situation was considered among the least competitive. 
 
The British case : toward more co-operation and more state intervention  
 
As we have seen, the British dispute resolution process relies heavily on co-operative 
discussions and settlements within the railway industry. This leads the various railway 
operators and Network Rail to meet frequently and to develop a cooperative and pragmatic 
approach. It is likely that long term relationships will be created. The reasons for that are 
twofold.  
First, by frequent interactions between people who are bound to reach an agreement, this 
process might lead to personal relationships reinforced by a common view over the many 
problems they have to solve.  
Second, railway industry is characterized by the presence of very specific assets and many 
joint devices which lead to joint costs. Economic theory (see Williamson, 1999) clearly 
predicts that this situation leads to integration or hybrid forms, at least. In a sense, we can 
consider that a network of people meeting frequently to solve common problems is, by itself 
an hybrid form. We can object that only part of the companies are involved in this process. 
But other aspects of the current evolution of the British railway industry tend to give credit to 
this hypothesis consisting in the evolution toward an hybrid form.  
 
This creates a form of barrier to entry, in the sense that it is more difficult to enter a market 
where the participants are already engaged in an intricate set of long term relationships. This 
increases also the risks of collusion by multiplying the possibilities to discuss thus enabling 
the existence of relationships unlikely to favor fierce competition.  
 
Let us consider now what can be qualified as an hybrid form: Network Rail. One of the many 
tricky questions concerning Network Rail is who is taking the main decisions. As regards our 
subject restricted to the domain where Network Rail is concerned – the interaction between 
railway operators and infrastructure manager – it seems, that the TOCs’ delegates can play a 
significant role. To understand the problems is obviously necessary, prior to define a 
negotiating policy. There is no evidence that the members of the board of Network Rail not 
originated from a railway operator can have this prior knowledge or acquire it easily. Even if 
there might be some exceptions, the general rule seems to be that, for those matters, the real 
power belongs to the TOCs’ delegates. To a certain extent, we are facing a quasi re-
integration. The main difference with a full re-integration is that, alone, a TOC has no power. 
But, together, the TOCs appear to have considerable power.  
 
Long term relationships, co-operation, quasi re-integration, all that contribute to limit the role 
of market forces contrary to what was apparently planed in the first years of the railway 
reform. Other considerations might be added. The TOCs have the possibility to invest by 
themselves to increase capacity where they judge it useful. Those assets will be finally bought 
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by the new entrant, if any, after the bidding process for the franchises renewal. It follows that 
a new entrant has to endorse the investment strategy of the incumbent, when bidding during a 
franchise renewal. One might object that this is true in any sector where some assets have to 
be transferred from one owner to another. However, some infrastructure investments might 
reflect some strategic policy. Thus the new entrant has to find a strategy compatible with the 
assets he will buy. This, again, will create some difficulties to enter the market.  
 
A last observation supports the convergence hypothesis: the government appears to be willing 
to play a bigger role. It seems even that the government is the final client of the railway 
industry. The Department for Transport wants to finance efficient rail services for a given 
price. That means that the government is playing a very important role in the capacity 
investment final choices.  
France : a conflict that will make competition more probable  
 
It is useful to recall briefly the main features of the French railways reform, less known than 
the British one, before analyzing how the dispute resolution process can favor the introduction 
of some form of competition.  
 
The situation currently prevailing in the French railway industry is the combined result of 
three major imperatives : 
the necessity to transfer into French law the European directives; 
the will to transfer part of the debt of the historic operator (SNCF) to an entity, different from 
the central government (to comply with the Maastricht criteria); 
the necessity to have at least a weak agreement with the Trade Unions. 
 
This led to the creation of RFF, a public entity, owner of the infrastructure and bearing a large 
part of the debt of the former integrated company. To have the agreement with the Trade 
Unions, the maintenance works were left to the train operator, leaving the SNCF de facto 
unchanged, with the restriction that it has to operate on tracks which belong to another entity. 
Again, partly to reach an agreement with the Trade Unions, the initial amount of 
infrastructure charges, paid by SNCF to RFF was inferior to the amount paid by RFF to 
SNCF for maintenance. Thus RFF was structurally bound to make losses. Those losses of 
RFF were balanced by government subsidies. This whole financing scheme had the objective 
of subsidizing SNCF, however these indirect subsidies have been reduced since last year. But 
direct subsidies to RFF are necessary, given that RFF cannot invest in such a way that its 
operating loss increases.  
 
This has created a strong antagonism with a seemingly powerful company, SNCF and a weak 
entity, RFF, benefiting under some circumstances from the support of the central government. 
Thus, there is a high risk that political interests prevail against the economic rationality. 
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Against this background, it is unclear whether a competitive pressure can be imposed on 
SNCF. Any competitor has to find its role in this asymmetric bilateral monopoly.  
 
We will pretend that this situation leads the weak player, RFF, which has a total control of 
new infrastructure investment, to impose so much damages to the powerful player, SNCF, 
that the operator is inclined to assert rather bluntly its rights. Defining the property rights is 
the first step to create a market. If we apply this basic principle to railway industry, we can 
easily see the importance of comprehensively defining what a company is buying when it is 
buying a slot. By asserting its rights, as an operator, SNCF is progressively lobbying to build 
a framework that will be useful to other operators. For the first step, competition can come 
trough the entry of open access freight operators. They will benefit very much from the clear 
definition of their rights, that SNCF is currently trying to impose.  
 
Other features of the French disputes resolution process can be considered as favorable to 
future competition.  
 
As very few people out of SNCF and RFF are skilled enough to intervene in a conflict, the 
arbitration body is or the ministry or the judiciary. So there is no risk of collusion, re-
integration or anything associated with the industry committee as we have seen for the British 
dispute resolution system. The political agenda of the ministry can be challenged by a 
recourse to the judiciary. Any study of an important problem has to be given to foreign 
consultants or academics. Independence might be stronger, even if this has clearly a cost.  
 
As any new capacity investment has to be paid by infrastructure charges (unless subsidies 
from public authorities), there is an incentive for the main operator to let other trains run on 
the network, to share the burden of the increment in access charges. Thus the structure of 
access charges, depending mainly of the Government, is crucial to enable competition under 
the form of open access for freight operators. 
 
With this final arbitration committee independent of railways industry, there is less room for 
collusion or long term relationships between operators and between operators and 
infrastructure managers.  
 
Finally, we can conclude that there is surely no good dispute resolution system, per se, for the 
railway industry in general. A system grounded on co-operation within the industry, as in 
Britain, is probably more efficient but will attenuate the strength of the competition. A system 
grounded on the rule of laws and relying on the arbitration of an independent committee is 
surely less flexible. But in the French context (with strong antagonism between RFF and 
SNCF), it is probably a good way to prepare for the progressive introduction of limited 
competition.  
 
 
 
 14 Insert book title here 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Henry C. and E. Quinet (1999). Which railways policy and organization for France?, Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy, 33, 119-126. 
Hicks, J. R. (1937) Annual Survey of Economic Theory : the Theory of monopoly, 
Econometrica 
Nash, C. (1997). United Kingdom. In: The separation of operations from infrastructure in the 
provision of railway services (ECMT, ed.), Round Table 103, pp. 53-89. OECD, Paris. 
Nilsson J. E. (2002) Restructuring Sweden’s Railways : the Unintentional Deregulation 
Swedish Economic Policy Review, 9, 229-254.  
ORR (2004). The Network Code.  
RFF (2004). National Rail Network Statement Timetable 2006. 
Williamson O. E. (1999) The Vertical Integration of Production : Market Failure 
Considerations In The Economics of Transaction Costs (O.E Williamson and S. E. 
Masten ed.) Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK.  
Yvrande-Billon, A. and C. Ménard (2005). Institutional constraints and organizational 
changes: the case of the British rail reform. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 56, 675-699. 
 
